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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of a collision involving a Stude-
baker automobile with five passengers therein, and large 
tractor and semi-trailer. Defendant was operating the 
tractor and semi-trailer, which in the record is referred to 
as tractor for the part with the engine, and trailer for the 
semi-tailer for brevity. The tractor trailer was proceeding 
in a southerly direction on a curve, and the Studebaker was 
proceeding in a northerly direction on said curve at the 
point of collision. As a result of said collision, Captain 
Neeshan, a guest passenger, was killed. He was a service 
man survived by a widow and two children. Captain Xena-
kis was killed; he was the driver, and was survived by an 
aged mother and father who looked to him for their sole 
support. The minor child of the Neeshan's was killed as 
was the minor child of the Lietz's. Connie Lietz was in-
jured in said collision. It was dark when the collision 
occurred. 
All vehicles approaching the curve going south in the 
direction the tractor trailer was traveling were unable to 
determine by reason of the curve, which side of the road 
vehicles coming from the opposite direction were on. This 
statement was made by the driver of the vehicle of the 
defendant R553-7. The area involved had been newly 
paved, and there was no center strip painted in at the time 
of the collision. The tractor and trailer crossed completely 
over to the wrong side of the highway, exhibits A, B, C, 
D, E, and F. The Studebaker ended on its left hand side 
of the highway in the borrow pit, only however, after 
having made one complete gyration or tum-around. 
The tire marks in the foreground of exhibit F were 
not made by the Studebaker. Defendant's own witness, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Faile so certified under oath as indicated on exhibit 00 and 
PP as indicated in the testimony of said defendant's wit-
ness R788-14, 793-14, defendant contends otherwise. The 
width of the said skid marks which crossed over to the 
wrong side from the undisputed evidence were wider than 
other marks approaching the scene R290-25, which other 
marks were identified as being the width of Studebaker 
tire marks and were on the Studebaker's right hand side 
two feet to the right of the center R296-19, while said 
marks going left as shown in exhibit F were wider and 
were made by a car the width of a Mercury (see exhibit 5 
showing the width differential). The marks in exhibit F, 
claimed by defendant as Studebaker marks and going to 
the left or the wrong side did not come up and approach 
and stop near the skid marks made by the tractor trailer 
in the said area R313-2, so the vehicle making the same 
could not have been involved in the collision. Note exhibits 
themselves A, B, C, D, E, and F. The entire left-hand side 
of the Studebaker was damaged and the right-hand side of 
the Studebaker showed no damage insofar as any direct 
collision or contact with the tractor trailer is concerned. 
The damage sustained by the tractor was entirely on its 
right-hand side. The manufacturer furnished def~ndant 
operator with a tractor record regulating servicing of said 
tractor involved in this collision. 
Said tractor record, exhibit EE, page 3, contains the 
following: 
"When relining brakes always reline both sides 
of the axel at the same time." 
The same exhibit on the :first blue page thereof shows that 
on September 24, 1951, a short time prior to the accident, 
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11. REFUSAL TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND DI-
RECTED VERDICT. 
12. THE ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PER-
MIT PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE WITNESS CUL-
BERT ROBINSON AND HAL NOYES. 
ARGUMENT 
1. ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY AN 
INSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO FAULTY BRAKES CAUS-
ING THE DEFENDANT'S UNIT TO SWERVE TO THE WRONG 
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY. 
Plaintiffs theory was based upon the premis that faulty 
brakes caused defendant's unit to swerve to the wrong side 
of the highway prior to impact. Plaintiff introduced into 
the evidence exhibit EE in which it was shown that the 
defendant relined the left-hand side of the tractor only. 
This was in direct violation and contrary to printed warn-
ings and instructions in said tractor record, published for 
the care and operation of said defendant's tractor involved 
in the collision. See said warning, on page 3 of exhibit EE. 
The brake expert Littlepage, at R 363-15 indicated he had 
observed as many as 150 skid patterns where there had 
been unequal braking. He also testiRed that letting the 
linings go too long would result in a cam lock, locking the 
tires R367 -15, and that when this occurs even when the 
brake is released, the tires will still be locked and skidding, 
R367 -22. Whether the cam will or will not lock can be 
determined by removing the cover, and making an exam-
ination R367-27. The expert testiRed at R370-27 that if the 
brakes are not equal on both sides, it will throw the tractor 
to one side of the road, throwing it to the side where the 
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braking coefficient is the greater. Littlepage tesfied that 
he has examined many cam locking skid patterns and upon 
examining the skid patterns shown on exhibit A, he indi-
cated that they appeared to be a cam locking skid pattern, 
R380-l, and that where one side is relined only, there is a 
differential in braking coefficient R381-21, and that where 
one side is relined only, the position of the cam on the 
roller will vary, causing greater braking coefficient on one 
side or the other because of the leverage principal R382-22. 
At R383-8, the expert testified that you could not have 
equal braking coefficient if you reline one side of the brakes 
on the tractor only. The expert Littlepage testified that 
he had experienced driving units where the brakes showed 
skid patterns like shown in the exhibits and that where 
brake marks are laid down as shown in exhibit A that it 
will throw the unit to the wrong side of the highway 
R385-12, and pull it to the side where the wheels are lay-
ing down heaviest skid patterns, see R371-l. The witness 
further testified at R391-16 that in his opinion the skid 
pattern definitely showed a locked cam on the unit, see 
also R407-4, and having in prior testimony indicated what 
is necessary to unlock the cam to stop the skid marking, 
the witness at R392-8 indicated that it was his opinion that 
the collision of the two units is what unlocked the cam. 
The jury was entitled to have submitted to them the ques-
tion of whether or not the negligence as produced by 
plaintiff, or faulty brakes caused the unit to swerve to the 
wrong side of the highway. Plaintiffs's requested instruc-
tions at Rl69 to Rl75 inclusive should have been given by 
the court and was mandatory under the law. The undis-
puted evidence showed a complete locking of the tires on 
the left hand side of the tractor and the exhibits all show 
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the same. The Sheriff, on cross examination at R617-6 was 
asked whether or not he knew what the law was relative 
to equal adjustment of brakes on both sides of the vehicle 
whereupon the court cried out that the court would in-
struct the jury on the law. The jury could only infer that 
counsel was misrepresenting the law or was deceitful in 
this respect, since there was never any pronouncement 
from the court concerning equal adjustment of brakes or 
that consideration should be given the matter or that there 
was any law on the matter. Later also it will be noted that 
the court intimated that counsel might be deceitful or even 
a stinker. 
The following cases require the court to give an in-
struction which permits the jury to consider the case on 
the theory of the parties presentation: 
WEBB vs. SNOW 
132 P. 2nd 114 102 Utah 435 
"Trial Court errored in refusing instructions present-
ing defendant's theory." 
MOMSEN vs. PERRY 
140 P. 2nd 772 104 Utah 151 
( 13) "Defendant entitled to have his case submitted to 
jury on any theory justified by proper evidence. 
Toone case cited 
The court failed to properly separate the theories 
of the parties, but instead gave general instructions 
as being mutual without regard to defendant's 
theory. 0 0 " 
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MILLER vs. SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
21 Pac. 2nd 865 82 Utah 46 
290 u.s. 697 
( 5) "That a party is entitled to have his case submitted 
to a jury on the theory of his evidence as well as 
on theory of whole evidence is recognized without 
argument. The jury must be instructed on the law 
as it is and applicable to the circumstances and 
theories as they are presented by the evidence." 
MARTINEAU vs. HANSON 
155 Pac. 432 4 7 Utah 549 
( 6) "The court must on request give a charge submit-
ting to the jury defendant's theory." 
TOONE vs. O'NEILL CONST. 
121 P 10 40 Utah. 265 
( 11) "Party is entitled to have his case submitted to the 
Jury upon his theory." 
McKINNEY vs. CAPSON 
99 Pac. 660 35 Utah 180 
( 15) "A party has the right to have the court instruct the 
jury upon the law on every material issue in the 
case in support of which there is some evidence." 
MORGAN vs. BIGLER STAGE 
238 Pac. 160 75 Utah 87 
PRATT vs. UTAH LIGHT 
169 P 686 57 Utah 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
Plaintiff had established from plaintifFs witnesses that 
relining one side of the brakes on the tractor would give 
less friction on the new lining than on the old lining, and 
thus make brake coefficient unequal on both sides. 
Defendant's witness was asked whether there would 
be less friction on the new lining than on the old, at R775-l 
when the court cried, without objection, and you don't 
need to answer. 
This was prejudicied error since he would have been 
required to say yes and thus require a directed verdict for 
plaintiff on admission of negligence. 
Since the legislature required that motor vehicles have 
the brakes so adjusted that they will be equal on both sides 
of the axle it was mandatory that the court instruct on this 
matter, when counsel requests same or calls the court's at-
tention to same and submits evidence thereon. 
2. ERROR IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE ON THE COURT'S 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 AND ON THE SINGLE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER DEFENDANT DROVE TO THE WRONG SIDE. 
Counsel for the plaintiff insisted that the court's in-
struction No. 4 (Lietz File Vol 2R88) be modified to in-
clude the movement of the tractor trailer to the wrong 
side which might be caused by faulty brakes R230, and 
the theory that defendant's driver must drive the vehicle 
to the wrong side to be negligent be deleted. This item, 
the court ignored. The jury could well find that the tractor 
trailer was never driven to the wrong side of the highway. 
In his deposition, the driver indicated that he did not tum 
it to the left hand side, and on evidence submitted by plain-
tiff it was indicated that the vehicle was pulled to the 
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wrong side of the highway by the excessive friction on the 
left hand side of the tires of the tractor rather than being 
driven there. Moreover, a finding that the Studebaker 
was on the wrong side, should not preclude guests from 
recovery if the tractor was also even partially pulled to the 
wrong side prior to impact, even if not driven there, par-
ticularly where defendant's negligence in brake care caused 
it to swerve to the wrong side, and if this was a contributing 
proximate cause of the collision. 
3. REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED 
UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 1B, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
11, 16, 17, 26, 27, SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF. PARTICULAR-
LY 26, AND 27, OR GIVING AN INSTRUCTION THAT BOTH 
UNITS COULD BE RIDING THE CENTER LINE AND YET 
PERMITTING GUESTS NEESHAN AND LIETZ TO RECOVER. 
The court erred in failure to give instruction 1b, R171, 
Exhibit EE. The manufacturer caused to be placed in the 
tractor record a warning that when relining brakes of said 
tractor, both sides of the axle must be relined at the same 
time. The evidence before stated indicates that the reason 
why the tractor record contains this warning is that it is 
impossible to have the brakes so adjusted that they will 
operate equally on the opposite sides of the vehicle with-
out compliance with this important warning and instruc-
tion contained in said tratcor record relative to the care and 
servicing of said vehicle in relining the brakes on both 
sides at the same time. Note also this is the only safety 
warning in the entire tractor record, since failure to reline 
both sides of the tractor, the court not only neglected to 
instruct the jury that the laws of Utah 1943 provided: 
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57-7-205 (7) (c) 
"All brakes shall be maintained in good working 
order and shall be so adjusted as to operate as 
equally as practicable with respect to the wheels 
on the opposite sides of the vehicle." 
but also neglected to properly instruct the jury with respect 
to the legal effect of an absolute showing that the defendant 
had been negligent in this particular respect. One side 
of the brakes only was relined in careless disregard of the 
published warning and is in not contradicted and even 
admitted by defendant's shop foreman at R768-24 and is 
a direct violation of the statute above quoted. The authori-
ties hold that failure to comply with a statute with respect 
to brakes is negligence per se, see: -
170 ALR at 660 
Plaintiff· requested a negligence per se instruction, and got 
none. The skidmarks and the record is conclusive on the 
fact that the braking coefficient was unequal. See skid 
marks in all photographs submitted. The expert also testi-
fied such practice resulted in unequal adjustment on op-
posite sides of the vehicle. 
The lower court not only ignored all of the above, 
but even refused instruction number 2 at R172 advising 
the jury that the law required equal adjustment and that 
they should consider from the facts whether there was 
such equal adjustment, and whether this neglect was a 
proximate cause of the collision. 
Instruction numbers three and four R174 would have 
permitted counsel to have argued that the maintenance 
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was negligence in failure to comply with the regulations 
in the tractor records, and the law and to have done so 
under court sanction as to what the law was. 
Under instruction 5 as requested, the matter of 
whether or not the defendant had discharged said de-
fendant's duty relative to maintenance of equal adjustment 
on both sides of the axle and maintenance in good work-
ing order could have been considered and argued to the 
jury. This instruction the court ignored, particularly with 
respect to whether or not inspections were involved which 
would have revealed any of the neglect charged. 
Instruction 8 R 178 should have been given as re-
quested since the negligence charged by the plaintiff orig-
inated in relining one side of the brakes only, also R368-1 
discloses that the mere removing of the plate would have 
shown that the cam on one side of the unit was turning 
over farther than the cam was on the other side where the 
brakes had been newly relined, and that the said in-
spection if it had been made would have revealed that 
greater pressure was being applied on one side than on 
the other side R383-11 causing unequal adjustment on op-
posite sides of the tractor. 
Failure to give instruction number 10 R 180 constituted 
error since defendant's witness Noyes testified that the 
Studebaker flashed its spotlight several times while the 
driver paid no attention to the Studebaker until he ob-
served that he was on a curve with no center mark and 
150 feet from said Studebaker R at which time he applied 
his brakes and there would have been no need for sudden 
application of the brakes had the driver been paying at-
tention and slowing down, and the sudden application of 
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the brakes, because they were not in equal adjustment is 
what caused the unit to swerve to the wrong side of the 
road. See also instruction 11 R 181 with respect to sudden 
application and resulting swerve. 
Instruction 16 R 189 quotes the state law reqmrmg 
that the braking efforts on the rear most wheels be applied 
at the fastest rate. Counsel for defendant stated that on 
defendant's unit they all were applied equally. The jury 
was entitled to an instruction on this matter since the 
legislature had spoken. 
Instruction 17 R 191 requires that the vehicle be in 
a safe mechanical condition. Plaintiff under proper in-
struction could have shown that defendant's unit was not 
in a safe mechanical condition. 
Instruction 26 R 202 should have been given since 
the jury could have found both vehicles to be in the center 
of the highway and yet permitted a guest not charged with 
negligence of the driver to recover and the jury was en-
titled to be instructed relative to what would constitute 
contributory negligence on the part of the guest. Like-
wise, instruction No. 27 R 203 should have been given to 
the jury so that counsel could have argued the matter of 
whether or not the tractor trailer was slightly over the 
center line and if it was, and if this caused the collision, 
that likewise, even if the Studebaker was slightly over the 
center portion of the highway that if the tractor trailer be 
partially over the center was a contributory proximate 
cause of the accident that the guest would be permitted 
to recover. 
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4. ERROR IN REFUSAL TO PERMIT GRANT STAPLES 
TO TESTIFY. 
Grant Staples was an independent witness whose farm 
adjoined the area of the collision. Plaintiff had purposely 
saved this witness for the last to testify. This witness was 
the one in counsel's opinion the jury would most likely be 
convinced by. The witness was brought up from Kanosh, 
Utah, and while he was so ill that he was confined to his 
bed while in Salt Lake City except for the half day that 
he came into court. The remarks of the Court R528-12-20, 
R529-2-17 in refusing to permit Staples to testify was prej-
udicial error. Tendering proof would only further agitate 
the court, and prejudice counsel before the jury. 
5. ERROR IN REQUIREMENT THAT ALL QUESTIONS 
TO THE EXPERT HARRIS BE SUMITTED AS HYPOTHET-
ICAL QUESTIONS. 
Dr. Franklin S. Harris, Jr. qualified as a physicist, and 
was at R428-6 qualified in research with respect to move-
ment of vehicles in collision. He was qualified in the field 
of mechanics. Dr. Harris also visited the scene of the col-
lision in the case at bar and, examined the skid marks, 
and examined the units involved, and made detailed meas-
urements and memoranda with respect to the damage 
demonstrated on both units. He also testified that he had 
the photographs, exhibits g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, and others 
with him for comparison at the time he examined the 
scene of the accident, and when he was examining the 
details with respect to the damage done the respective 
units, and was personally present when the white strip was 
being painted in the center of the road R433-8. At R435-7, 
the doctor was also able to make measurements and de-
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termine the precise angle at which the tractor skid marks 
intercepted the newly painted center line on the highway. 
The expert measured the skid marks and made observa-
tions of the jiggling marks of the dual wheels as demon-
strated on the highway. The doctor had also made meas-
urements of the small light scratch marks on the Stude-
baker door, which were uniform in distance between each 
other, to determine where the door had engaged the tractor 
to imprint such uniform marks thereon, and had determined 
that this was made by the right running board of the 
tractor which had uniform imprints of the same width 
thereon and pressed them on the left door of the Stuebaker. 
The doctor also determined where the center of gravity of 
the Studebaker was and where the Studebaker came to 
rest by the location of the peculiar Y post seen in the ex-
hibit E and its location in relation to the crescent on the 
highway. At R437-4, and 440-16, the court without ob-
jection from defendant, declared the former questions as 
being leading. This was prejudicial error since it preju-
diced counsel for plaintiff in the eyes of the jury, it appear-
ing to the jury that counsel was improperly conducting the 
examination. Counsel did not lead the witness, or indicate 
what the answer should be, he was merely directing his 
attention to particular items he had measured particularly 
with respect to the pattern on the Studebaker door show-
ing that the door had engaged the running board of the 
tractor. Again at R444-10, the court without justification 
interrupted counsel when he was merely inviting attention 
to the distance between certain areas which is certainly not 
a leading question. How can a witness tell what he found 
unless his attention is directed to a particular item. 
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In the administration of justice, courts should not 
interfere with orderly processes of interrogation of a wit-
ness, and the courts should by their conduct in the ad-
ministration of justice give counsel and the jury a feeling 
that the court is impartial, and trying to be fair, and should 
not make it appear to the jury that counsel is either stupid 
or deceitful. At R447-6, the court instructed counsel for 
plaintiff that he would not be permitted to ask a question 
of the expert unless it was a hypothetical question, see also 
829-30. Counsel indicated to the court that where the ex-
pert was familiar with facts, he should be entitled to indi-
cate what facts he had under consideration, and give his 
opinion as based on the facts he found. Court would not 
permit anything other than hypothetical questions, and 
would not permit counsel to argue the law on the same 
at R455-13. The court pronounced that the expert would 
not be permitted to give facts he had observed and placed 
counsel· in an embarrasing position to ask further factual 
questions. Moreover, at R459-25, the court again without 
objection refused to permit counsel to have the expert testi-
fy concerning the fact that the tractor had only one wheel 
on each side of the front of the vehicle, with two sets of 
duals on the rear of the tractor, and the skid marks exam-
ined by the expert were made by duals, and there were 
no brakes on the front of the tractor. Since the expert 
observed that the dual skid marks had a jiggle in the same, 
and was of the opinion that this jiggle was produced by 
an impact, having measured the angle, knowing the dis-
tance from the rear of the tractor to the front of the tractor, 
the doctor could have shown the precise position of the 
tractor at impact, which would have placed the front of 
the tractor completely over on the wrong side of the road. 
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Yet the court knew that plaintiff's witnesses were all killed, 
and having to rely on an expert, refused to allow the expert 
to testify or examination on the subject. It may, in the 
court's mind, have been sixth grade arithmetic as stated 
at R459-25, but the court overlooks the fact that many 
jurors who are not involved in daily processes of mathe-
matical computations may not understand complicated 
matters, and may have forgotten geometry and should have 
the items explained to them in detail, and counsel should 
be entitled to fully present such matters, particularly the 
relation of the angle to the position of the tractor on impact. 
Again at R469-3, the court without objection from 
counsel stopped the expert in the middle of a sentence and 
instructed him to confine himself to hypothetical facts, and 
how the machine moved according to the law of physics, 
and not what he observed relative to skid marks or other 
physical facts. At R482-14 counsel with the examination 
of the two units along with the expert knew that the left 
side of the Studebaker contacted the right side of the 
tractor and also lmew that notwithstanding the terrific im-
pact, the right front fender of the Studebaker did not 
engage the tractor and the entire front fender of the Stude-
baker escaped impact and that this must require the im-
pact to be at an angle, also the license plate on the bumper 
of the tractor had been actually printed on the Studebaker 
at a definite angle. There was a definite scratch on the 
bumper of the Studebaker made by the pin in the bumper 
of the tractor showing angle of movement as the units en-
gaged each other and it should also be borne in mind that 
the center of gravity of the Studebaker was known, and 
that the Studebaker rotated on an axis like scissors with 
the front bumper of the tractor in a clockwise motion. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
At R483-22 the court would not even permit testimony on 
whether the unit would move clockwise. The driver of the 
tractor of defendant had claimed that the Studebaker at 
no time came from out of the field, and was at all times, 
even at point of impact with all four wheels on the pave-
ment R568-l. It is obvious and apparent from the theory 
of the defendant that the tracks which were made by the 
Mercury could not have been made by the Studebaker 
since if the tracks, foreground exhibit F, had been made 
by the Studebaker with the impact occuring on the trac-
tor's side of the highway, the Studebaker would of neces-
sity had to have its rear part off on the unpaved part of 
the highway to have engaged the tractor at the angle it 
was known to have engaged the same. Exhibit F (or any 
other exhibit) does not show any skid marks off the high-
way. While on the other hand if the tractor had been on 
:the wrong side, and the Studebaker hit it head on and at 
an angle, the angle, rotation, and all facts would have been 
consistent with the damage demonstrated. Yet the court 
at R483-2 said he didn't see any hypothetical question you 
can base that on and on the same page at line 22 another 
objection unproperly sustained. Certainly the dotcor should 
have been permitted to testify to the fac~s he observed, 
and give his opinion on this matter to show that the col-
lision had to be on the Studebaker's right hand side of the 
.highway. 
Again at R484-14, counsel still attempting to pursue 
this matter is stopped by the court, this time, however, 
with objection made by counsel for defense. Again at 
R485-20, through the next several pages, it will be observed 
that the court even refuses to permit testimony when coun-
sel attempts to phrase the same upon hypothetical ques-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
tion basis, as to whether the matter would fly forward or 
not, the court had no right to stop counsel from giving 
expert opinion on the matter. It was important relative to 
deposit of debris seen in the exhibits to consider whether 
impact at a certain point would be consistent with where 
debris was deposited. As a matter of fact the debris seen 
in the foreground of the exhibits was entirely interior con-
tents of the Studebaker. The highway patrohnan had ob-
served that had the impact occurred at the crescent these 
interior contents could not have come through the floor 
board of the car, and would of necessity had been deposited 
upon a subsequent gyration some time after impact, and 
the expert had made measurements and calculations as to 
the precise · place these objects were deposited in such 
movement after impact. Yet he was not permitted to ex-
press an opinion on this matter, or even indicate what cal-
culations he had made on the same. The skid marks and 
the damage to the units told a complete story, and plain-
tiff was entitled to have this story put before the jury. The 
fact that Dr. Harris happened to be an expert should not 
have precluded him from the right to tell the jury what 
facts he had observed and the court was in error at 
R518-24 indicating that counsel could argue to the jury 
and show the jury what had happened, and yet pronounce 
that it would not be proper for Dr. Harris to demonstrate 
his theory to the jury. At Rl58, counsel again pressing the 
importance of what slippage there was, if any, between 
the two units after impact, and what precise points of the 
unts engaged each other, R518-28 in asking the expert to 
demonstrate how the crease on the side of the Studebaker 
was placed there, and was interrupted by the court with-
out having completed his sentence, and without objection 
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from defendant and was not permitted to express an opin-
ion or demonstrate how the damage was accomplished on 
the Studebaker. The court further at R519-8 and 20 merely 
permitted the expert to give his measurements disclose 
relative to damage and which parts of the units engaged 
each other. See also R519-18 where the court refused to 
permit the expert to show any part of his theory relative 
to the angle of engagement or the gyration or scissors 
actions of the cars with respect to their respective contacts. 
The Studebaker, as shown in exhibit T had tire marks on 
the rear of the same. Observe also that this mark is of a 
concave nature, or in the form of a crescent, and also ob-
serve on the large exhibit of the tractor that the rear dual 
has a noticeable scuff mark on the same. It certainly re-
quires an expert to make a determination as to how, under 
the facts observed, these respective units engaged each 
other, to make such marks yet the court at R520-21 sus-
tained an objection on this very matter. Again at line 
17 R 521 the question was again put up, and objection sus-
tained by the court. The court would not even permit 
counsel to cite the law counsel had available, relative to 
this matter, see: 
2 JONES on Evidence 703 
The position of the crescent on the highway where the 
defendant claimed the accident occurred, was .found by 
the doctor to be exactly straight across from the Y post 
observed in exhibit M in the smaller ones, and E in the 
larger ones. It will be observed that the Y post intercepts 
the line of the Studebaker about at the hub on the rear 
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wheel. Had the Studebaker therefore advanced forward, 
even its length, it would have been impossible for the col-
lision to have occurred by the crescent, since as observed 
from the photographs, the Studebaker had advanced only 
about three-fourths of a length opposite Y post. Should 
the angle of impact have been sufficient to have caused 
the Studebaker to strike and rotate rapidly, advancing for-
ward and engaging the side of the tractor as it advanced, 
as one gear engages another gear, and then turning around 
again it would have been impossible for the collision to 
have occurred at the crescent or on the tractor's side of 
the highway, and the Studebaker to have stopped at a 
distance much shorter than 36 feet north of the crescent. 
It is known that the units did engage each other as gears 
engage each other from the marks on the respective units 
and the tires. The movement of the Studebaker from the 
point of impact on the Studebaker's side of the highway 
forward, depositing the seats at the point seen in the ex-
hibits and swinging around over against the Y post was 
entirely consistent with the measurements and theories 
produced by Dr. Harris, yet the court at R483-23, when 
the doctor was asked if he had an opinion as to the relative 
movement of the respective vehicles, particularly the dis-
tance of the Studebaker would likely have traveled forward 
after initial impact, the court sustained an objection there-
to without counsel for defendant having given a legal 
reason for said objection. Please observe in the testimony 
of the expert of the defendant that like prejudice was not 
demonstrated by the court. The court permitted the ex-
pert for defendant to testify to anything and everything, 
including the giving of testimony which had been objected 
to, and purporting to demonstrating his entire theory. 
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6. ERROR IN THE COURT CREATING PREJUDICE TO 
THE PLAINTIFF IN THE FOLLOWING: 
A. STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO READING PART 
OF NOYES' STATEMENT. 
At R748-3 the court stated: 
"Go ahead Mr. Schoenhals; I say this to you, (turn-
ing to the jury), if either of these lawyers read you 
half of a question, you might assume that they are 
trying to deceive you. That should be reason enough 
to you gentlemen that if you don't read out all of 
the question they are going to think you are a 
stinker." 
R 493-3. 
64 CJ 93 
"Criticism of counset s conduct of trial - It is error 
for the court to comment unfavorably, in the pres-
ence of the jury, on the conduct of the trial by 
counsel for one of the parties, especially in view 
of the fact that counsel in such situation is without 
opportunity to resent such criticism without risk to 
himself and injury to his client's cause with the 
jury." 
Chistman vs. Union Ry, Co. of New York City 
205 N.Y.S. 594, 210 App. Div. 104 
(Rev. 200 N.Y.S. 800, 121 Misc. 247) 
See Kluge vs. Northern Pac. Ry Co. 
9 P. (2d) 74, 167 Wash. 294 
(applying the rule) 
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Holding Counsel up to ridicule - The trial judge, 
when counsel makes contentions which are not 
deemed sound, should overrule them with dignity, 
and not use language holding counsel up to 
ridicule." 
Schafer vs. Thurston Mfg. Co. 
137 A. 2, 48 R.I. 244. 
An examination of the record well discloses that Noyes, 
a hostile and adverse witness was under cross examina-
tion. He had given Mr. Summerhays a statement. The 
witness was not only under cross examination, but the 
statements he had given in writing to Summerhays prior 
to the trial were being used to impeach the witness. Mr. 
Hanson over objection of counsel for plaintiff was prac-
tically leaning on shoulders of counsel in connection with 
statements being read. The trial judge in accordance with 
the cases above should have given a ruling with dignity 
without using language which might hold counsel up for 
ridicule before the jury. It is the contention of counsel that 
litigants and the parties interested in proceedings in whic~ 
the negligence causing the death of loved ones is being 
adjudicated, should entitle said parties to a ruling of this 
appellate court showing them that judicial system does 
not sanction unjudicious remarks and that such discussion 
has no place in our courts in the administration of justice, 
particularly, when the jury might even infer that counsel 
is intentionally trying to deceive them, and that he might 
even be a "stinker." Such remarks frustrate counsel and 
justice, and do not lend dignity to judicial proceedings, 
and cause counsel to feel that counsel is being intimidated 
by the court against doing his best to make a proper pres-
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entation and is being deterred in preservation of a record. 
Such comments on the part of the court can well account 
for lack of scientific preservation of the record under ob-
jection and continued comments of the like from the court. 
The remark speaks for itseH as to whether or not it is prej-
udicial, and the faith of litigants in unbiased and un-
prejudiced judges and in our judicial system, should be 
restored by this appellate court pronouncing that there is 
no place in our courts of justice for such remarks, in the 
administration of justice. 
B. COURT RAISING OBJECTION TO ASKING A LEAD-
ING QUESTION AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF C. 
ROBINSON IN ABSENCE OF OBJECTION FROM 
COUNSEL. 
R362-6 Counsel for plaintiff was asking the Sheriff a 
question on cross examination as to whether or not the 
Sheriff knew that the state law required brakes to be in 
equal adjustment on both sides of the vehicle. The court 
did not even permit counsel to complete his question when 
the court cried out: 
"Well now let me tell the jury what the law is and 
let's not be telling them by inference here. If we 
need any law told to the jury, I will explain that 
to them so you don't have to bother the Sheriff 
about it." 
Counsel carries much responsibility in determing the 
future financial support of minors of a deceased service man 
with several deaths being involved and when the court 
without objection and in an angry voice interrupts counsel, 
and will not permit counsel to cross examine, particularly 
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when counsel could have taken exhibit EE and shown the 
Sheriff that the tractor record EE was on the tractor at 
the time of the collision and had he opened and read the 
same, that a violation of the would have been apparent, 
counsel appeals to the higher court in the interest of the 
justice to hold such action by the court as being prejudicial 
error. This should particularly be held as being prejudicial 
error in view of the fact that the jury was informed by 
the court that certain conduct would entitle them to infer 
that counsel was trying to deceive them and that they 
might think counsel was a "stinker," and the court then 
tells the jury that the Sheriff will not be permitted to be 
examined on this, and that if there is any law that needs 
to be told the jury that the court will explain, and tell 
them. The jury could well infer from this statement that 
counsel actually was trying to deceive them, since the court 
neglected to instruct the jury that there was any law in 
the State of Utah requiring the brakes to be in equal ad-
justment and being silent on this item the jury would of 
necessity have to infer that counsel was deceitful in this 
respect and was attempting to misrepresent to them what 
the law was.· 
When counsel is on tension in a strenuous law suit 
involving the entire financial future of many people and 
bears the responsibility of presenting to the best of his 
ability the facts to the jury, the tedious strain is such in 
the interest of justice and proper consideration to the 
nervous excitement of counsel, and the opinion of litigants 
and jurors of our judicial system that the courts should 
be most cautious and considerate of litigants and counsel 
and avoid any statements from which prejudice, anger, or 
frustration of the Administration of justice might be caused. 
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7. ERROR IN REQUIRING THE JURY TO CARRY ON 
UNTIL ABOUT 10:00 O'CLOCK P.M. WITH THE CASE. 
At about 4:00p.m. on Thursday, the court announced 
that he would not grant an additional day for the trial 
of the case R228. No pronouncement had been given prior 
to that time that the time of trial would be shortened and 
that plaintiff would not be permitted the right to put on 
rebuttal and particularly that plaintiff would not be per-
mitted to have Dr. Freeman from Fillmore, Utah, appear 
and testify on Friday. Counsel for plaintiff had called the 
doctor long distance the day before, and the doctor had 
agreed to £y up Friday morning in his own private aircraft 
to appear as witness. The court was familiar with this fact 
R228. From a careful survey of the witnesses to testify, 
the material necessary to be placed before the jury, counsel 
for plaintiff had determined that this was the earliest time 
he could have the doctor present to testify. It was ap-
parent to counsel that the evidence to be submitted would 
consume the entire day Thursday and that rebuttal would 
go forward Friday, which would have been the fact had 
the court not insisted on an evening session. Counsel there-
fore was acting in good faith in requesting the doctor to 
fly up Friday morning, and recognizing the fact that the 
doctor was the only doctor in the city of Fillmore in con-
nection with the hospital, and in the public interest felt 
that it would be unwise to have him come up and sit all 
day Thursday to appear on Friday. The entire theory of 
the case of the defendant and the entire defense of the 
defendant's was that the marks in the foreground of ex-
hibit F were made by the Studebaker, going over to the 
wrong side. This was not only denied by Faile, who signed 
affidavits on photographs to the contrary, but also by Dr. 
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Freeman who was standing near the bodies and in a posi-
tion where he actually observed these marks being laid 
down by a Mercury. It was not proper for plaintiff to 
place Dr. Freeman on in the evidence in plaintiffs case 
in main. It would have been properly objectionable as 
anticipating the theory and defense of defendant's case. 
Yet the court refused to grant one day's time or to give 
plaintiff time necessary in which plaintiff could present an 
eye witness to the laying down of tracks in exhibit F as 
being made by the Mercury, rather than the Studebaker. 
This was most important and constituted prejudicial error. 
It is also very objectionable to make it appear to the 
jury that they were required to take supper and return 
and stay until 10:00 p.m. in the evening listening to the 
trial when it appears ~s though it was the plaintiff's fault 
for their being retained, and particularly when one of the 
lady juror's had announced that she had a friend in Utah 
from out of the state and she was most anxious to spend 
the evening visiting with said friend. In a case so involved 
as this, plaintiff should have been granted at least an hour 
to sum up the evidence and present the case, and in the 
fixing of time, such a request at such a late hour would 
have infuriated the jury and would have been prejudicial 
to the case of the plaintiff, particularly where the jury was 
required to stay late into the evening. The grandfather of 
one of the children killed in the accident knew a court 
was in session where the litigants were given over thirty 
days time in the trial over issues as to which was going 
to prevail, .where millions of dollars were concerned and 
all parties wealthy. It is most difficult for counsel to ex-
plain to the widow and orphans of a service man why 
the court would not grant just one more additional day 
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for trial of their case and yet would extend to other peo-
ple a full thirty days of the court's time. 
8. PREJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF COUNSEL FOR DE. 
FENDANT IN CLOSING "DRIVER CHARGED WITH THE 
DEATHS OF PARTIES INVOLVED." 
Counsel for the defendant insisted that the driver, 
Laren Somsen, sit through the entire trial notwithstanding 
the fact that plaintiff had invoked Rule 43 F, which should 
have excluded said driver. There was not only error in 
this respect, but when counsel for the defendant was 
summing up his case to the jury he extended his hand to 
the driver sitting in the presence of the jury with a long 
sad forlorn looking face and told the jury that plaintiff 
had charged the driver with the responsibility of the death 
of the people involved. This was highly prejudicial and 
should have been grounds for a mistrial. It was also a 
mis-statement of the theory of plaintiff's case, since plain-
tiff had contended that the relining of one side of the 
brakes was to be considered in negligence which caused 
the vehicle to swerve over to the wrong side. Under the 
instructions given by the court, the jury could not help 
but be sympathetic to this sad looking driver when the 
judge had instructed the defendant, not the driver, could 
only be found negligent if the driver drove to the wrong 
side. The court having refused to instruct the jury on the 
negligence with respect to the relining of the brakes re-
quired the jury to come in with a verdict in favor of the 
defendant in absence of proof that said driver negligently 
drove to the wrong side. The jury could not even consider 
negligence of the driver in suddent application of brakes 
as being a factor. Moreover, plaintiff had tried this case 
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in the absence of the sympathetic widow and orphans with-
out any of them appearing to generate sympathy and then 
counsel for the defendant notwithstanding the fact that 
counsel for plaintiff had confined the trial strictly to the 
facts without the introduction of the sympathy angle or 
prejudice, struck a deliberate blow below the belt by 
making it appear to the jury that the driver was charged 
with something. The jury could anticipate jail or other 
difficulties when as a matter of fact the driver was not even 
made a party defendant. Fair play on the part of the court 
should have at least granted plaintiff a new trial under such 
unfair statements made by counsel for defendant. 
9. COURT REFUSING TO EXCLUDE LAREN SOMSEN, 
THE DRIVER, AFTER PLAINTIFF HAD INVOKED RULE 43 F. 
The court erred in refusing to exclude the driver Laren 
Somsen under Rule 43F particularly when the court ruled 
that the Rule 43F havirig been invoked required all of 
plaintiff's witnesses to remain outside of the court room. 
Somsen was not a party to the suit, he was the driver of 
the car, and was kept in the court room for the sole pur-
pose of generating sympathy on the part of the jury. The 
defendant likewise had their officers in court, said officers 
sitting with the counsel for defendant. Plaintiff had no 
one sitting with counsel and all of plaintiff's witnesses were 
excluded. 
10. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL AND PERMIT DR. FREEMAN TO TESTIFY ON FRI-
DAY TO SHOW HORACE CLARK WAS THE FIRST MERCURY 
DRIVER, AND NOT THE MERCURY DRIVER UNDER DIS-
CUSSION AND TO BRING IN HAL NOYES, MR. FAILE, AND 
MR. TALBOT TO SHOW THE SAME. 
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The court erred in refusing to give one additional day 
trial which would have permitted plaintiff to proceed on 
rebuttal and show that the skid marks upon which de-
fendant had relied as being made by the Studebaker fore-
ground exhibit F, were not made by the Studebaker and 
were actually made by a Mercury coming to the scene 
skidding and up close to it leaving tire marks in an at-
tempt to stop. There was definite evidence that the Mer-
cury came close, and made skid marks, and the marks in 
exhibit F shows only 1 set of skid marks where are the 
Studebaker tire marks, except on the right side of the road. 
The trial judge could have and should have granted a 
new trial. This is particularly important since the affiidavit 
in the motion for new trial R228 et seq which was not 
denied, appropriately called this. to the court's attention. 
Moreover, counsel for defendant intentionally pulled a sur-
prise witness by requesting that Hal Noyes, Talbot, be ex-
cused before the witness Clark was called to testify. Clark 
drove a Mecury car up to the scene and counsel for de-
fendant as well as the witnesses who were at the scene 
of the accident all knew that Clark was not the Mercury 
driver who laid down the tracks shown in exhibit F as 
b~ing under consideration in this cause. Counsel for plain-
tiff should have been granted leave to have a new trial 
or at least have the opportunity to have had the matter 
heard on Friday permitting Dr. Freeman, Faile, Noyes, and 
Talbot to appear before the court and give testimony to 
the fact that the Mercury driver Clark was driving a dif-
ferent colored Mercury and was not the Mercury driver 
that slapped on his brakes and laid down tracks shown 
in exhibit F. 
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11. REFUSAL TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND DI. 
RECTED VERDICT. 
Appellant established by the evidence the fact that 
defendant was negligent in relining only one side of the 
brakes of the tractor. The appellant likewise established 
the fact that this negligence caused the tractor to swerve 
to the wrong side of the highway. These facts were never 
refuted, since the tratcor did go to the wrong side of the 
highway, and the driver claims that he did not tum it 
that way. The appellant likewise showed that the tracks 
of the Studebaker where they approached and stopped 
abruptly at the point of contact with the tractor skid 
marks, placed the Studebaker on the right hand side of 
the highway at point of impact R. Counsel recognizes the 
fact defendant claims there is some evidence submitted by 
the defendant which would tend to indicate that the marks 
in the foreground of exhibit F were made by the Stude-
baker, however, under the maxim of the laws which states 
that "the case of a party is not stronger than it is left at its 
weakest point on cross examination." And since the de-
fendant is required to admit as testified to by Mr. Faile 
their own witness that the marks on which defendant had 
relied were not made by the Studebaker, but were aqtually 
made by a Mercury car; the court should have instructed 
the jury that under the evidence submitted, the negligence 
of the defendant was the proximate cause of the collision 
and for them to assess damage, since there could be no 
contributory negligence on the part of a guest under the 
evidence submitted, and would have left only the question 
as to whether or not the driver Zenakis was guilty of con-
tributory negligence for the jury to consider. 
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The authorities uniformly hold that a party to an 
action may not cross examine said parties own witness. 
70 CJ 615 article 781 
58 AM JUR 342 article 618 
Mr. Faile testified that the marks in the foreground of 
exhibit F were not made by the Studebaker and were 
made by the Mercury, see exhibits 00 and PP. The testi-
mony must stand as submitted, and the court erred in 
permitting counsel for defendant to cross examine their 
own witness over objections of counsel for appellant. More-
over, the authorities likewise hold that a party may not 
impeach said witness, and Mr. Faile having given evidence 
which exploded the entire theory of defendant's case, an 
attempt on the part of the defendant to impeach his own 
witness as given was error and the court should have sus-
tained the objection thereto. See: 
5 AM JUR 437 Article 792 et seq 
Faile testified he saw the Mercury right where the skid 
marks in question were made R788-28. Faile, after using 
his best judgment and stating that the marks defendant 
claims were made by the Studebaker were actually made 
by the Mercury, was under redirect examination. See 
R793-19 where Faile stated that E. L. Schoenhals did not 
tell said Faile that certain marks were Mercury marks, but 
asked him to use his judgment in selecting same. The fact 
is established that Faile voluntarily and with his best judg-
ment declared the tire marks to be Mercury marks in ex-
hibits 00 and PP. Moreover, it will be observed that this 
witness was not related to the plaintiffs and cannot be 
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placed in the category of the exceptions with respect to 
impeachment of one's own witness. The record discloses 
that the defendant's witness Faile had made the selection 
of the marks being made by the Mercury at his own leisure 
R788-14 and had identified the same in his sworn written 
statement. By producing him, plaintiff had vouched for 
his credibility and should not be permitted to attack or 
to attempt to change his testimony in order to make it 
consistent with defendant's theory, and defendant was 
bound by his testimony. The authorities likewise hold that 
the law should not permit counsel to use this as a means 
of coercing his witness in order to change his mind on a 
subject where he has made voluntary disclosures. It was 
apparent from the record that the witness Faile belonged 
to the brotherhood of truck drivers, that he was friendly 
to the truck driver, and that he was adverse to the plaintiffs 
in the case. Mter said Faile had of his own election and 
using his best judgment described the tracks upon which 
defendant had relied as not being actually made by the 
Studebaker as being made by the Mercury while he was 
present and saw them laid down R788-28, the lower court 
erred in permitting counsel for defendant to cross examine 
and impeach this witness over objection and asking him 
leading questions and tricking him to line his testimony up 
again in a consistent manner, friendly to the truck driver 
of the defendant. 
At least the lower court should have recognized the 
requested instruction submitted as lB and have permitted 
the jury to determine only whether or not the negligence 
in failure to reline brakes on both sides and sudden applica-
tion was the proximate cause of the collision. 
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12. THE ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PER-
MIT PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE WITNESS CUL-
BERT ROBINSON AND HAL NOYES. 
When counsel for appellant was proceeding in trial 
from the items indicated above, it was quite· apparent that 
the court making it most difficult for counsel for appellant, 
in raising objection on the court's own motion, without 
objection from opposing counsel and intederring with the 
normal procedure relative to normal cross examination and 
ruling against counsel for appellant on items upon which 
counsel for appellant now urges to be prejudicial error, 
and without even giving counsel an opportunity to argue 
the law or complete his question or inform counsel con-
cerning the basis of a ruling. At 611-18 the sheriff was 
asked whether the law required brakes to be in equal ad-
justment, and objections thereto in error sustained. Coun-
sel for appellant should have been permitted to ask the 
Sheriff what he observed with respect to the skid marks 
all being made by one side of the tractor R611-18, and 
what he observed with respect to the skuffing marks on 
the tires. Counsel again asked the Sheriff, Mr. Robinson, 
if he was familiar with the law requiring brakes to be in 
equal adjustment both sides of the vehicle R617-6, counsel 
asks the indulgence and patience of this court and requests 
that some recognition be given to a situation where the 
court cries out an interruption before a sentence is even 
completed and further frustrates counsel, so that counsel 
is in no mental condition to make a scientific pedect 
record when no legal reason is given for the objection 
counsel is unable to frame another question that will not 
be objectionable. The situation should not require counsel 
to keep pressing the court and making it appear to the 
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jury that counsel is quarreling with the court. Moreover, 
where the court appears already prejudiced and angry, 
counsel could well assume that the continued pressing of 
items might result in further reprisals and vindicitive action 
on the part of the court to the prejudice of counsels clients, 
counsel respectfully requests that this court take notice of 
these factors in declaring as error the unrequested objec-
tion volunteered by the court with respect to the evidence 
of the Sheriff Culbert Robinson. 
With respect to the evidence of Hal Noyes, this wit-
ness testified that he saw the Studebaker on the wrong side 
of the highway. He also testified that the Studebaker ap-
proached the scene striking the tractor with the right front 
fender of the Studebaker and bounced to the Studebaker's 
left hand side without becoming involved in any further 
collision with the tractor or the trailer, and without turn-
in around and made such statements under oath prior to 
the time said Noyes appeared in court. Counsel for ap-
pellant took this witness down to the wrecking yard where 
the Studebaker was taken, immediately after the accident, 
and had there the pictures of the scene and Studebaker 
and tractor which are now displayed to this appellate court 
as exhibits. The witness Noyes examined the pictures, 
examined the wrecked Studebaker and also examined a 
tractor which was near the Studebaker, which tractor was 
the same type as was involved in this collision. Counsel 
for appellant asked Noyes to examine the pictures and 
determine whether or not the pictures reflected with fidelity 
the damage and scene as he remembered it, to which he 
replied "yes." Noyes then examined a crease in the door 
of the Studebaker and measured the distance of the said 
crease in the door from the ground with his leg against 
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the door of the Studebaker holding his hand on his leg 
where the crease in the Studebaker door was made. He 
then walked over to the tractor again measuring the height 
of the running board on the tractor on his leg from the 
ground. Noyes admitted to counsel for appellant that it 
appeared as though the Studebaker under closer scrutiny 
struck with the left fender rather than the right fender, 
and that it was apparent that after striking the tractor 
that the Studebaker made a complete turn around en-
gaging the tractor's right hand running board against the 
left hand door on the Studebaker and then swerving around 
again and that it also appeared as though the Studebaker 
could have been facing forward again striking the rear 
duals of the trailer only, after having made a complete 
tum around or one complete revolution. The witness Noyes 
indicated that he did not observe any of this gyration and 
could not believe that it happened until he had convinced 
himself by making the observations which he made at the 
wrecking yard, and that he knew for certain he was now 
mistaken on what he thought he had observed. The wit-
ness Noyes also could have made his observations of the 
Studebaker being on the wrong side after it had impacted 
on the right side of the road, and made a complete revolu-
tion, and had advanced 36 feet, which is double its length, 
and on its last impact with the trailer appeared at the 
point to said Noyes, to have been on the wrong side of the 
highway, and this would be the only time that Noyes could 
have seen the Studebaker since he was only 50 feet behind 
the trailer. The court should bear in mind it was dark. 
It was most important to appellant's case that these items 
be permitted to be admitted into the evidence on the cross 
examination of Noyes, yet the trial judge erroneously at 
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R756-15 stopped counsel from cross exammmg Noyes on 
this very vital detail, and again at R756 refused to permit 
counsel on cross examination to bring out the fact that 
things happened at the scene of the accident which Noyes 
did not observe and which upon closer scrutiny he was 
convinced did actually occur. The right of cross examina-
tion has never been so curtailed or refused to counsel's 
knowledge. 
The following authorities support counsel in holding 
that the rights of cross examination should not be inter-
ferred with by the court and that great latitude should 
be extended counsel. 
70 CJ 611 
"A party has a right to cross examine witnesses 
who have testified for the adverse party, and his 
right is absolute, and not a mere privilege. 
~ ~ ~ It is not within the discretion of the court to 
say whether or not the right will be accorded." 
70 CJ 615 
"The right to cross-examine witnesses of the adverse 
party being absolute 76 it should not be abridged 
77." 
Citing Utah case. 
58 AM. JUR. 340 
These cases should require a complete reversal of the 
abuse of the lower court in refusing counsel the time 
honored, privilege of cross examining adverse witnesses. 
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SUMMARY 
In this action two service men were killed. While 
their dependents were burying their dead with no person 
interested in protecting their rights, not even the Sheriff, 
and with all the witnesses in plaintiff's car killed with the 
exception of one who was asleep and seriously injured, it 
must be apparent to this appellate court that it was only 
under laborious petition that counsel was able by court 
order to go into the records and bring before the court 
disclosure of the negligence of the defendant in failure to 
maintain brakes in such condition that the said brakes could 
be applied equally on both sides, and when suddenly ap-
plied would cause the unit to swerve to the wrong side of 
the highway. Had it not been for the pictures taken, and 
the work of counsel looking into these issues, and in re-
viewing records that had been produced under court order, 
none of these details would have been available. It is very 
discouraging to counsel after having worked for months 
examining records, interviewing experts, and going through 
evidence which discloses conclusive evidence of negligence 
on the part of the defendant as well as conclusive evidence 
that such negligence in relining brakes on one side only 
would cause the vehicle to be on the wrong side of the 
highway at impact, to have the court completely ignore 
this most important theory as well as the many requests 
prepared and submitted thereon in the thirty instructions 
submitted. Our juries always give considerable weight to 
pronouncement from the bench concerning what the law 
is. Since the jury was instructed, "You are not to consider 
as evidence any statement of counsel made during trial," 
the failure on the part of the court to give judicial sanction 
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to the law or any legal recognition to the theory of the 
Plaintiff, or any instructions upon which plaintiff might 
have argued under judicial sanction with respect to plain-
tiff's theory was prejudicial error. Moreover, with the in-
creasing number of deaths on the highways, practices in-
dulged in by large trucking companies which are con-
trary to the published manual of instructions of the manu-
facturer of said tractors particularly when the brake ex-
pert testified that such negligence on the part of the truck-
ing company is the very cause of the unit going over the 
center line, such flagrant violations of safety warnings 
should be discouraged by our courts. If trucking companies 
can indulge in such practices resulting in property damage 
and death, particularly where they are running units on 
our highways the maximum width permitted under our 
law, where even an inch or two on the wrong side of the 
highway might mean death, and then receive judicial ap-
proval, of such conduct without even a mention by our 
court that such conduct might constitute negligence, it is 
apparent that such action by our courts is prejudicial to 
maintenance of safety standards as well as the rights of 
parties and orphans deprived of future support through 
such flagrant disregard of rights of life and property. The 
law should be quick to recognize established negligence 
particularly where the death of a service man forced to 
be away from their families and who are forced to use the 
road more than normally, are concerned. The Civil 
Aeronautics Board always makes an investigation to deter-
mine the cause of aircraft accidents, yet we have the death 
of four people involved, and a case where the Sheriff or 
highway patrol did not even measure the length of the 
skid marks, or make any note of the fact that the skid 
~1 
I  
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
marks were all on one side, or check the tractor record 
to find out whether or not the defendant had discharged 
his duty with respect to keeping the brakes in equal ad-
justment on both sides of the tractor when it was obvious 
and apparent the brakes were not in equal adjustment from 
the skid marks or whether the skid marks crossing over 
were the width of the Studebaker guage. Then we have 
the court, after counsel has been diligent in presenting 
such fact, not only disregarding the law and the facts in-
volved, but also scolding counsel for attempting to find 
out why the Sheriff was so negligent in this respect. 
May it please this court to entertain a ruling that from 
the showing made that it was negligence per se for the 
defendant to be so grossly negligent in disregarding the 
published warning given in the tractor record, and that 
since the collision involved vehicles approaching each 
other from opposite directions, that the question of which 
unit was on the wrong side of the highway would be 
most important, and that this would constitute the proxi-
mate cause of the damage sustained. Counsel sincerely be-
lieves that the showing of failure to reline both sides, to-
gether with the statement of the expert, that this would 
cause the unit to swerve to one side or the other, supports 
the contention that such neglect and failure was negligence 
per se. 
The court should have at least given the requested 
instructions that this would constitute negligence, and that 
the jury had only one problem to determine, and that was 
whether or not this negligence was the proximate cause 
of the accident. Moreover, both the tractor and the Stude-
baker could have both been traveling in the center of the 
highway, and Neeshan and Lietz recover as guests, and 
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they must necessarily so recover as guests since the de-
fendant showed no evidence of contributory negligence on 
the part of said guests. True, no recover could be had in 
behalf of Xenakis should the jury find that Xenakis was 
driving down the center of the highway at the time of 
the collision, however, no instruction was given permitting 
the guest to recover under such circumstances, which was 
error on the part of the lower court. 
Counsel should be permitted to try his case without 
undue interference from the court with respect to whether 
or not a witness should be permitted .to testify. The judge 
in the administration of justice should not determine the 
quantum of evidence to be submitted. The court should 
not place counsel in a position where counsel appears to 
the jury to be improperly proceeding, or making it ap-
parent to the jury that counsel is unnecessarily detaining 
them for a period longer than the court thinks necessary 
by having the witness Staples from Kanosh questioned on 
details on which some testimony had been theretofore 
given. This is particularly true where counsel feels that a 
particular witness might· impress the jury with his sincerity, 
his candor, and his firm appraisal of the items he observed. 
Plaintiff established the case in main on the pictures 
and testimony of experts, together with the records of the 
defendant. This being the case, counsel for plaintiff should 
not be punished for having exercised deligence in having 
the expert review the scene, make measurements, and ac-
quire facts, as a matter of fact, more facts than the Sheriff 
and highway patrolman had to exhibit to the jury with 
respect to the facts of the area involved and all other facts 
including the very angle at which the skid marks of the 
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tractor intercepted the center line on the highway as it 
was being painted in, together with the angle of the units 
as they collided from the facts observed. When counsel 
is cautioned that all questions under circumstances of this 
type must be made as hypothetical questions, and when 
it has been demonstrated in the presence of the jury that 
the court questions the propiety of such evidence counsel 
should not be required to continue to tender answers and 
have the court sustain objection thereto, or the court on 
its own motion object thereto without counsel knowing 
the basis of the objection, and thus making it appear to 
the jury that counsel is attempting to proceed improperly. 
When counsel is faced with the burden, under such strain, 
of carrying the burden of proof, the court in refusing to 
permit argument on the questions of whether or not the 
expert could give an opinion based upon the facts he ob-
served after having related the facts is certainly prejudicial 
error. Moreover, the conduct of the trial judge in suggest-
ing objection and objecting himself, and sustaining ob-
jections in error was prejudicial error. It is certainly prej-
udicial error to have the court preclude the expert from 
showing the movement of vehicles after collision, and 
whether or not the Studebaker could have struck at the 
crescent and still come to a stop at the point it was known 
to have come to rest. This is most important since it is 
obvious that had the collision occurred at the crescent 
where claimed by the defendant, that the Studebaker ad-
vanced the length of said Studebaker in engaging the left 
hand door of the Studebaker against the right running 
board of the tractor, which would have placed it down 
the road 18 feet, and that it would have advanced another 
18 feet in turning around to strike the rear dual of the 
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trailer. Also, knowing the center of gravity of the Stude-
baker, the axis on which the Studebaker was gyrating on 
and the respective jiggles in the tire marks, the expert, from 
the fact he had observed was in a position to show the 
relative movements of these vehicles after collision and to 
show that it was impossible for the collision to have oc-
curred at the crescent on the tractor's side of the highway 
and yet have the Studebaker come to rest at the position 
shown as Y post where the pictures showed it came to 
rest since this was at a point directly across from the 
crescent which would mean that the Studebaker did not 
advance more than half its length forward after impact. 
Moreover, the court erred in refusing to permit the ex-
pert to indicate what, in his opinion, made the crescent, 
notwithstanding the fact that he had observed the units 
as well as the skid marks and the damaged parts on the 
respective units and compared them all with the pictures. 
It was admitted at Rl00-14 that the trailer tire went flat. 
The expert and Noyes both knew from the examination 
of exhibit C that the rear duals on the tractor were scuffed, 
and knew from exhibit T as well as examination of the 
Studebaker that the concave tire marks on the back of the 
Studebaker were made by engaging the rear duals of the 
tractor, yet the expert was ·not permitted to testify on such 
matters, give an opinion, or even answer inquiries on 
hypothetical questions with respect thereto. 
The record does not disclose any conduct on the part 
of counsel for plaintiff of antagonism towards the court, 
or any justification for the court to tell the jury that they 
might assume counsel was trying to deceive them, or that 
they could think that counsel was a "stinker." Where 
hostile witness who are mistaken, and have admitted to 
on 
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counsel that they are mistaken, and yet attempt to main-
tain a false position, that they have taken to satisfy their 
own ego in maintenance of consistency, counsel should be 
granted great latitude in cross examining them on their 
statements without having the court make pronouncements 
calculated to frighten counsel from pursuing such cross 
examination, and making it appear to the jury that counsel 
might be deceitful in attempting any such procedure. Such 
remarks are not only highly prejudicial, but can frustrate 
justice and frustrate professional skill, wisdom, and judg-
ment, and can frustrate not only counsel, but the adminis-
tration of justice. Such pronouncements should be de-
clared by the appellate court to be most unjudicious and 
inappropriate, and not in the interest of the administration 
of justice. 
Thad Hatch, a party in this litigation was familiar with 
the facts that Judge Larsen's court was involved in a trial 
lasting more than thirty days. Counsel for plaintiff is un-
able to explain why one more day could not be granted 
for this case to have Dr. Freeman testify, and to have put 
on rebuttal, and why the court should insist on the matter 
being carried through to completion into the late evening, 
without giving warning of the same until after 4:00 o'clock 
in the afternoon of the last day that counsel would be per-
mitted sufficient time to submit the evidence, particularly 
where counsel had accommodated the court in the con-
solidation, and had accommodated the court on stipula-
tions almost to the point of prejudice all in the interest of 
time. It was most certainly prejudicial error to continue 
proceeding with the trial without leave of having one more 
day, and was an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
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court to insist that counsel proceed without leave of pro-
ducing Dr. Freeman. 
Plaintiffs did not parade the sympathy angle before 
the jury of the orphans and the widow, and the aged 
parents, and were they excluded from the court and not 
permitted to testify. Counsel assumed counsel for de-
fendant would be fair and that counsel for defendant 
should at least under the usual professional practices ex-
pected, not indulge in petty prejudices and parade the 
sympathy angle of the driver before the jury, and then in 
the final summation to the jury, point to the driver as 
being charged with the responsibility of the deaths, caus-
ing the jury to cringe with sympathy for the driver. Fair 
play would dictate the granting of a new trial for such 
conduct. 
The court actually excluded the witnesses for plain-
tiff, and all the parties for plaintiff, yet they permitted this 
driver, Laren Somsen, to remain for the entire trial. 
The trucking company, with its vast enterprises was 
able to correspond and locate a second Mercury driver 
who appeared at the scene, who was not the one to skid 
and run tracks up to and near the scene of the wreck 
While under our standards of procedure, counsel might 
get by withholding of this witness until they had inten-
tionally requested all other witnesses who were present 
when this Mercury approached, to be excused, and all the 
time knowing that Mr. Clark was not the Mercury driver 
who made the tire marks in question. Most certainly the 
court was in error in not permitting a new trial and re-
calling Talbot, Noyes, and Faile to show that Clark's Mer-
cury did not make the tracks shown in exhibit F and that 
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there was actually another Mercury at tbe scene. More-
over, Dr. Freeman would have shown conclusively that the 
Mercury did make the marks in question. The jury could 
well assume that the entire theory of plaintiff's case was 
void since Clark's Mercury did not make any tracks, and 
that under the law of averages, it was most unlikely that 
two Mercury cars would appear at the scene of the acci-
dent immediately after the accident, and one lay down 
tire marks, and another appear and make no marks. This 
actually did occur and these witnesses as well as Dr. Free-
man would have so indicated, had the plaintiff been given 
an opportunity to try the case on Friday. In the interest 
of administration of justice a new trial should be granted 
with instructions that from the proof submitted all plain-
tiff's requested instructions should have been given, to-
gether with a reversal on all points submitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. L. SCHOENHALS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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